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The treatment of emotion vocabulary in 
FrameNet: Past, present and future 
developments1 
Josef Ruppenhofer 
Abstract 
Both for psychology and linguistics, emotion concepts are a continuing challenge 
for analysis in several respects. In this contribution, we take up the language of 
emotion as an object of study from several angles. First, we consider how frame 
semantic analyses of this domain by the FrameNet project have been developing 
over time, due to theory-internal as well as application-oriented goals, towards 
ever more fine-grained distinctions and greater within-frame consistency. Second, 
we compare how FrameNet’s linguistically oriented analysis of lexical items in the 
emotion domain compares to the analysis by domain experts of the experiences 
that give rise (directly or indirectly) to the lexical items. And finally, we consider 
to what extent frame semantic analysis can capture phenomena such as connota-
tion and inference about attitudes, which are important in the field of sentiment 
analysis and opinion mining, even if they do not involve the direct evocation of 
emotion. 
1 Introduction 
Emotions are a core part of human experience and also well represented in lan-
guage. Both for psychology and linguistics, emotion concepts are a continuing 
challenge for analysis in several respects. In this contribution, we take up the 
language of emotion as an object of study from several angles.  
 
1 The author was partially supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG) under grant RU 
1873/2–1. 
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The first goal is to illustrate how FrameNet,2 the project implementing an anal-
ysis of the English vocabulary in terms of Frame Semantics, ‘works’. Using emo-
tion vocabulary as our case study, we consider how FrameNet's analyses have 
been developing over time, due to theory-internal as well as application-oriented 
goals, towards ever more fine-grained distinctions and greater within-frame con-
sistency. 
A second goal of this study is to explore how FrameNet’s linguistically oriented 
analysis of lexical items in the emotion domain compares to the analysis by do-
main experts of the experiences that give rise (directly or indirectly) to the lexical 
items. Despite the skepticism expressed towards lexical analysis by some domain 
experts such as Scherer (2000), we want to examine to what extent the notions 
FrameNet uses for its analysis do match ones found in psychological theories. 
Finally, we consider whether and how frame semantic analysis can capture 
phenomena such as connotation and inference about attitudes, which are im-
portant in the field of sentiment analysis and opinion mining, even if they do not 
involve the direct evocation of emotion. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We first introduce Frame 
semantics and FrameNet in section 2. In section 3 we consider how FrameNet 
dealt with the vocabulary of emotion in its earliest phases. This is followed by an 
overview of psychological theories of emotion in section 4, with special focus on 
lexical theories of emotion. In section 5, we return to FrameNet and discuss newer 
developments in how it deals with the vocabulary of emotion. We then broaden 
our view beyond the core emotion vocabulary and consider issues of connotation 
and attitude inference in section 6. We offer a summary and conclusions in sec-
tion 7. 
2 Frame semantics and FrameNet 
The FrameNet project represents the attempt to implement frame semantics as 
conceived by Charles Fillmore (1982; 1985). The theory of frame semantics is both 
temporally and conceptually prior to its specific embodiment by FrameNet. As a 
theory of linguistic semantics, it focuses on the knowledge that speakers make 
 
2 The project’s homepage is found at: framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu. 
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use of in producing and understanding utterances. It emphasizes continuity be-
tween language and experience. Frames are schematic representations of situa-
tions as well as their participants, props, and parameters. Words are said to evoke 
such frames. Lexical semantics in the frame semantic mold seeks to capture the 
motivation within a speech community for entertaining the relevant frame con-
cept. 
The electronic database that the FrameNet project builds contains descriptions 
of the semantic frames underlying the meanings of the English words being ana-
lyzed, and information on the valence (semantic and syntactic) of simple words 
and multi-words, derived from a sample of annotated attestations from corpora 
of contemporary British (BNC) and American English (ANC). The FrameNet da-
tabase is intended to serve both theoretical linguistic research and applications of 
natural language processing (Baker et al. 1998). It is made accessible in a struc-
tured format that supports both human study and browsing, as well as machine 
readability. 
The types of situations that FrameNet analyzes include all aspectual classes, 
covering states, processes, activities and relations. Some frames also focus on en-
tities/things (e. g. Clothing, Hair configuration). The participants, 
props and roles of a frame can include agents, inanimate objects, elements of the 
setting, and properties/parameters of the situation. The syntactic dependents 
(broadly construed) of a predicating word correspond to the frame elements (FEs) 
of the frame (or frames) associated with that word. 
Despite Fillmore’s early work on case grammar (Fillmore 1968), FrameNet does 
not assume a set of universal semantic roles that applies to all predicates. Each FE 
is defined relative to a single frame. However, FEs in one frame can be related to 
FEs in another frame via frame-to-frame relations (see below), thereby allowing 
for the capturing of generalizations. But these connections between FEs of differ-
ent frames need to be stated explicitly: identical FE names in different frames are 
not meant to imply identity or equivalence. Finally, the vast majority of FEs is 
assigned a semantic type that, broadly speaking, reflects the selectional re-
strictions on role fillers. 
FrameNet has a net-like structure because of the relations connecting frames 
to each other. FrameNet employs several types of frame relations, the most im-
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portant of which are INHERITANCE, SUBFRAME, PERSPECTIVE ON, and USING. INHER-
ITANCE is FrameNet’s label for the is-a relation. The SUBFRAME relation connects 
a child frame which is a subevent of a complex event to that complex parent 
frame. For instance, the Criminal process frame has subframes of Arrest, 
Arraignment, Trial, and Sentencing. A frame that stands in a PERSPEC-
TIVE ON relation to another provides a particular view on an ‘unperspectivized’ 
parent that is an alternative to at least one other kind of view. The Hiring and 
Get a job frames, for instance, take the employer’s and employee’s view, re-
spectively, on their parent frame Employment start. In the USING relation, 
the child frame presupposes the parent frame as background. The Volubility 
frame for instance uses the Communication frame. 
Frame relations are accompanied by parallel, but potentially partial, mappings 
between the frame elements of the frames that are in a relation. These FE map-
pings allow one to, for instance, recognize the identity between a SUSPECT in the 
Arrest frame and a DEFENDANT in the Arraignment frame. 
A Lexical Unit (LU) is the pairing of a morphological lemma with a meaning; 
a word sense. The meaning of a LU is partially expressed by the relation between 
the lemma and a FN frame, i.e. between lexical form(s) and the semantic frame 
they evoke. FrameNet covers LUs of any lexical category (verbs, nouns, adjec-
tives, prepositions, etc.). The Similarity frame, for instance, includes among 
its LUs the preposition like, the adjective similar, the verb resemble, and the noun 
difference. Multi-word expressions (MWEs) are also possible LUs for FrameNet to 
include: the Similarity frame includes the MWE spitting image. As can be 
seen from the list of lexical units in the Similarity frame, FrameNet puts an-
tonyms in the same frame (e. g. similar, different). The inclusion of spitting image 
illustrates that the members of a frame are not all equally general or specific: 
spitting image applies to similarity of appearance only, unlike the other LUs. 
The semantic analyses of FrameNet are based on data and documented through 
annotations on example sentences. Such annotations are performed in one of two 
modes. In the lexicographic mode, FrameNet annotates instances of particular LUs 
from a corpus. The instances to be annotated are sampled from the corpus in such 
a way that the full set of combinatorial possibilities (in the relevant corpus) is 
captured. The annotations are, however, not meant to be statistically representa-
tive: frequent patterns of FE realization do not receive more annotations than less 
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frequent ones. These lexicographic annotations do not fully cover all frame-evok-
ing words in the sentences, let alone documents, in the underlying corpora (BNC, 
ANC). However, FrameNet has another mode of annotation, full-text, in which 
every instance of every frame-evoking word and its FEs are labeled on specific 
documents, resulting in dense annotations that show how frames embed each 
other and collocate. 
Annotated instances of LUs record the following information about the LUs’ 
syntactic dependents: their FE role, their phrase type, and their grammatical func-
tion. By way of example, let us briefly consider FrameNet’s Revenge frame. Its 
definition mentions the core frame elements (which bear frame-specific, non-uni-
versalist names) and their relationships within the frame: 
This frame concerns the infliction of punishment in return for a wrong suffered. 
An Avenger performs a Punishment on an Offender as a consequence of an 
earlier action by the Offender, the Injury. The Avenger inflicting the Punish-
ment need not be the same as the Injured Party who suffered the Injury, but the 
Avenger does have to share the judgment that the Offender's action was wrong. 
The judgment that the Offender had inflicted an Injury is made without regard 
to the law. 
Each FE is also defined and exemplified separately, though we do not show this 
here so as to conserve space. In the FrameNet database, the Revenge frame is 
recorded to be a subtype (by INHERITANCE) of the frame Rewards and Pun-
ishments. Its siblings include the frame for Fining, which unlike the Re-
venge frame is defined against a legal background and involves punishments in 
the form of financial levies. Some sample annotations in the Revenge frame are: 
(1) One day [she AVENGER] would get even [with Donna OFFENDER] [for this INJURY]. 
[INI PUNISHMENT] 
(2) One day [I AVENGER]’ll get back [at you OFFENDER]. [DNI INJURY] [INI PUNISHMENT] 
(3) The next day, [the Roman forces AVENGER] took revenge [on their enemies OF-
FENDER]. [INI PUNISHMENT] [DNI INJURY] 
(4) [The ban PUNISHMENT] is [Prince Charles’s AVENGER] revenge [for her refusal to 
spend Christmas with the rest of the royals INJURY]. [DNI OFFENDER] 
In examples (1)–(4), the targets are marked in bold font, support verbs appear 
underlined, and FEs are enclosed in square brackets. The group of examples in-
cludes verbal and nominal targets. It also illustrates that the realization of FEs 
may vary quite a lot within a frame. For instance, the FE OFFENDER is marked by 
three different prepositions in examples (1)–(3). As these last two observations 
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indicate, FrameNet’s analyses provide resources for recognizing paraphrases. 
This capability has, for instance, been exploited in the automatic recognition of 
textual entailment (Burchardt 2008). 
Further, since frames are understood to be cognitive representations of situa-
tions, rather than just specific linguistic meaning representations, they are as-
sumed to possess considerable generality across cultures and languages. While 
this generality is known to have its limits (e. g. Boas 2009), it is nonetheless broad 
enough to have 1) spawned sister projects to FrameNet for several other lan-
guages (among them, for instance, Spanish, Swedish, Japanese, Brazilian Portu-
guese) and 2) given rise to considerable interest in Frame semantics as an inter-
lingua for translation. Speaking in an oversimplified manner, one might say that 
aligned FrameNet resources for multiple languages allow one to approach trans-
lation as a problem of cross-language paraphrase. 
It is important to keep in mind that historically the main focus of FrameNet 
has been on frames that can be lexically evoked, as valence is its key concern. 
Accordingly, while FrameNet does include some so-called non-lexical frames 
which cannot be directly evoked by lexical material but which are relevant for 
capturing background relevant to related groups of frames, that state of affairs is 
the exception rather than the rule. FrameNet does therefore not deal with scripts 
in the sense of Schank and Abelson (1977) such as the restaurant script, for which 
no sizable amount of specific lexical material is available. Finally, note that 
FrameNet is for the most part concerned with general language vocabulary. Some 
work has, however, been done on specific domains and more efforts along these 
lines exist outside of FrameNet (e. g. BioFrameNet (Dolbey et al. 2006), Kicktion-
ary (Schmidt 2009)). 
3 Original treatment of emotion vocabulary in FrameNet 
Emotion vocabulary is a core and, in terms of quantity (Hobbs and Gordon 2008), 
well-developed part of a language's vocabulary. Not surprisingly, emotion was 
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one of the 13 general domains that the FrameNet project set out to handle when 
it began.3 
In the first two releases of the FrameNet database (1.2 and 1.3), the emotion 
vocabulary was grouped into frames by several criteria being applied separately 
and in parallel. Some frames were, unsurprisingly, motivated by valence patterns 
(sentence perspective). For instance, the frame Experiencer subj was dis-
tinguished from Experiencer obj since for the former group of predicates 
the experiencer is realized as a subject (5) and for the latter it is realized as an 
object (6) in active-form sentences. 
(5) [I EXPERIENCER] like ice-cream. 
(6) Ice-cream pleases [me EXPERIENCER]. 
Other frames, picked up on salient metaphorical conceptualization. For instance, 
the frame Emotion heat held lexical units such as boil.v, simmer.v, stew.v, 
which are all motivated by the EMOTION IS HEAT metaphor (Lakoff and John-
son 1980). Still other frames were motivated by particular emotion concepts: for 
instance, the frame Desiring contains lexical units expressing forms of desir-
ing. 
- Experiencer subj (love.v, like.v, hate.v; fear.v; resent) 
- Experiencer obj (please.v, displease.v; anger.v) 
- Emotion directed (angry.a at) 
- Subject stimulus (satisfying.a; pitiful.a) 
- Desiring (hope.v, desire.v, desire.n, covet.v, hankering.n) 
- Judgment [Judgment direct address, Judgment communication] (reproach.v : 
 approve.v) 
- Desirability (okay.a; nasty.a, pitiful.a; great.a, marvellous.a) 
- Emotion heat (stew.v, simmer.v, boil.v; burn.v) 
It is clear that in some cases the original frame organization assumes a relatively 
unspecific shared background given the considerable differences between the LUs 
included in particular emotion frames. For instance, the Experiencer obj 
frame contained the verbs please and anger, which reference rather different 
kinds of emotions. Likewise, and maybe more surprisingly, the adjective angry 
 
3 The full list of domains includes HEALTH CARE, CHANCE, PERCEPTION, COMMUNICATION, 
TRANSACTION, TIME, SPACE, BODY (parts and functions of the body), MOTION, LIFE STAGES, 
SOCIAL CONTEXT, EMOTION and COGNITION (Baker et al. 1998). 
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and the noun anger belong to a different frame from the verb anger, even though 
they all reference the same emotion. 
Observations such as these made it desirable to consider a reorganization of 
how the emotion vocabulary is structured into FrameNet frames. However, be-
fore we consider what developments have been ongoing in FrameNet’s modeling 
of the emotion domain, we will go on an excursion into psychological theories of 
emotion. While FrameNet clearly seeks to capture laymen’s (folk) understandings 
of their experiences, it is instructive to consider how domain experts conceive of 
emotions, especially because it has always been controversial how a psychologi-
cal theory of emotion should relate to a linguistic analysis of the emotion vocab-
ulary. Notably, while speakers may talk about their emotions in what may be 
(mere) folk categories, their linguistic productions constitute the bulk of the pri-
mary data that psychologists studying emotion have available. 
4 Psychological theories of emotion 
In this section, we briefly survey psychological theories of emotions at a high-
level of abstraction, following the discussion in Scherer (2000), and then look 
more closely at one particular subtype, lexical models. 
 
Figure 1: The circumplex model ( = Figure 2 of Russell 1980,1167) 
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Dimensional approaches propose that one or more dimensions such as valence 
or activation/arousal are sufficient to capture the most important differences be-
tween emotions. A well-known instance of multi-dimensional models is the cir-
cumplex model of affect (e. g. Russell 1980; Plutchik 1980), in which emotions are 
arranged on two dimensions, valence and arousal (cf. Figure 1). The model is in-
tended to capture several key aspects of emotions (or emotion terms).4 First, 
many emotions are associated with oppositions (happy-sad). Second, most of the 
variance in rating studies where similarity of emotions (emotion terms) is judged 
can be accounted for by the two dimensions of valence and arousal. Finally, the 
different emotions (emotion terms) can be differentiated and do not simply lie on 
top of each other along the axes in the space of emotions. 
Categorical approaches (also: discrete emotion approaches) assume identi-
fiable distinct types of emotions. A well-known instance of this approach is Ek-
man (1992), who suggests that there are six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, 
anger, disgust, fear, surprise) that people across cultures can recognize in others 
based on their facial expression. The basic set of emotions is assumed to have 
proven useful as evolutionary adaptations. Besides the basic emotions, additional 
emotion types are believed to arise as combinations of the basic types. As sug-
gested by Scherer, one piece of evidence favoring discrete emotion-approaches is 
the fact that high-frequency verbal labels exist that seem to refer to prototypical 
emotions (anger, sadness, etc.). 
Meaning-oriented approaches constitute a third type of psychological 
model. These rely on the structure of the semantic field of a language's emotion 
terms to build a psychological model. One subtype of meaning-oriented model is 
the lexical model. While Scherer notes the intuitive appeal of this approach as it 
accesses what he calls “common cultural interpretation patterns” (148), he casts 
doubt on such approaches ultimately leading to a better understanding of emo-
tions: 
The linguistic labels attached to specific types of affective states are not always 
helpful. As is true for many other areas of psychology, popular usage of some terms 
 
4 Note that as Figure 1 shows, in Russell's work the stimuli were adjectives. They are treated as 
“emotion names”. There is no explanation how the emotions evoked by verbs like love, please, etc. 
might fit into the analysis. 
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has created semantic constructs that are less than optimal for exact scientific de-
scription. (Scherer 2000, 142) 
In addition, according to Scherer, there is a social-constructivist strand of emotion 
research, which assumes that the meaning of emotion depends on socio-cultur-
ally constructed patterns of behavior and values. A language’s lexicon is taken to 
reflect the speakers’ social constructions of emotional meaning. 
Componential approaches proceed from the joint assumptions that emo-
tions result from a cognitive evaluation of a situation (though not necessarily a 
conscious evaluation) and that this evaluation produces a pattern of reactions in 
different domains of response (physiology, action tendencies, feeling). In his own 
componential approach, Scherer defines emotions as follows: 
[… ] emotions are episodes of coordinated changes in several components (includ-
ing at least neurophysiological activation, motor expression, and subjective feeling 
but possibly also action tendencies and cognitive processes) in response to external 
or internal events of major significance to the organism. (Scherer 2000, 139) 
Scherer points out that different theories within the componential approach dif-
fer on how differences between emotions are conceived of and how many differ-
ent emotions there are. On the relation between emotions and emotion labels in 
language, he says: 
The bases of verbal labels of emotional states are the changes in conscious subjec-
tive feeling states. Although the feeling states may reflect all the changes charac-
terizing an emotion process in all of the organismic subsystems, verbal labels often 
represent only a salient part of those changes, those that reach awareness. (Scherer 
2000, 150) 
Given our linguistic interests, we will now look more closely at some lexical mod-
els, Scherer’s skepticism of their value for psychological theory-building notwith-
standing. For a linguistic theory of the emotional vocabulary, the psychological 
theories that looked most closely at linguistic evidence for emotional experience 
are clearly relevant. And given the frame semantic perspective we are taking, the 
“common cultural interpretation patterns” that are activated by emotion terms 
are what we are after (Scherer 2000, 148). 
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4.1 Ortony et al.’s models 
We start by considering Ortony et al.’s (1987) analysis of what they call the affec-
tive lexicon. 
The authors propose the taxonomy displayed in Figure 2. Note that the predicates 
that they analyze are overwhelmingly adjectives, deverbal participles included 
among them. Verbs, in particular non-stative verbs, are underrepresented. 
Figure 2: Ortony et al.’s taxonomy of affective conditions ( = Figure 1 of Ortony et al. 1987, 349) 
In their analysis, the most prototypical examples of emotion terms are those that 
(a) refer to internal, mental conditions – in distinction to external and physical 
ones; (b) are states as opposed to actions or properties/dispositions; and (c) which 
focus on affect rather than on behavior or cognitions as their referential focus. 
Importantly, Ortony et al. (1987) make a distinction between words that refer to 
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emotions and words that implicate emotions.5 Ortony et al. propose a test for 
what constitutes a genuine emotional term. The adjective happy, for instance, is 
considered to be a genuine emotion term because subjects rate both “feeling 
happy” and “being happy” as emotions. By contrast, the term ignored is not taken 
to be a genuine emotional term, because while subjects consider “feeling ignored” 
an emotion, they do not do so with respect to “being ignored”. 
In subsequent work, Ortony et al. (1988) lay out a model for the cognitive struc-
ture of emotions. This model is intended to be one of the emotions, rather than 
of the lexical items people use to refer to emotions (as they understand and expe-
rience them). On the other hand, for this model of emotions, language is used as 
evidence for the existence of particular emotions. Note that the typology of Or-
tony et al. (1988) has influenced research in Artificial Intelligence (Elliott 1992, 
Hobbs and Gordon 2008) that modifies and extends the model. However, we will 
not consider this subsequent work here. 
One goal of Ortony et al.’s model is to capture the qualitative differences be-
tween the emotions that dimensional models typically obscure. The authors also 
want to explain how people’s construals of their experiences cause them to expe-
rience certain emotions. Further, Ortony et al. are interested in how different 
emotions are related to each other, and what the structure of the individual emo-
tions is. Accordingly, they focus on these particular aspects: 
- eliciting conditions, 
- variables that influence the intensity of emotions, 
- distinguishing affective and mental conditions that are genuinely emo-
tional from those that are not. 
The organization of emotions in Ortony et al.’s model is shown in Figure 3. At 
the highest level, the emotions are grouped into three broad classes, reflecting 
their focus on one of three salient aspects of the world that the authors assume 
are central: events, agents, and objects. Event-based emotions are said to be based 
on goals. Agent-based emotions are taken to reflect the fact that we attribute re-
 
5 This is the central concern of these authors. The taxonomy they develop is seen as more of a by-
product of their discussion of what does and does not refer to an emotion. Another important con-
cern for Ortony et al. (1987) is the question whether emotions are prototype concepts or not, an 
issue we will not take up here. 
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sponsibility to agents in terms of standards of behavior. And object-based emo-
tions are taken to be based on attraction, which is taken to ultimately be rooted 
in attitudes. 
Figure 3: Emotion typology of Ortony et al. (1988, 19) 
Note that in Ortony et al.’s model what is referred to as intensity is the actual 
intensity of instances of emotional experience rather than what one might call 
lexical intensity. The fact that love.v communicates a more intense emotion than 
like.v is not what they focus on. Rather, different instances of loving can be ex-
perienced with different intensity depending on various global and local factors. 
Global factors are ones that play a role for any kind of emotion, such as the ex-
periencer’s level of arousal. Local factors are ones that come into play only for 
particular subtypes of emotions. For instance, the degree to which one is happy-
for somebody else depends (among other things) on the degree to which ones 
likes that person: I might be happier if my wife or my brother wins the lottery 
than if my neighbor or colleague wins. 
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4.2 Appraisal theory 
As a second lexical model, we will consider Appraisal theory (Martin and White 
2005), which is a theory within Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL) rather than 
psychology. We include it in this discussion because it represents a sizable body 
of work and because it has been influential on sentiment analysis. 
From the point of view of SFL, language is a resource for relating ideational, 
interpersonal and textual meaning to each other. Appraisal is understood to be 
about interpersonal meanings concerned with negotiating social relations. Ap-
praisal theory consists of three sub-theories for affect, appreciation, and judg-
ment, as shown in Figure 4. We will discuss these sub-systems in turn. 
4.2.1 Affect 
Affect is a basic “system” within the theory. It covers the expression of emotions 
of any kind (happiness, fear, etc.). According to Martin and White (2005, 42) 
“[a]ffect is concerned with registering positive and negative feelings: do we feel 
happy or sad, confident or anxious, interested or bored?” 
Affect is subdivided further by various criteria. One criterion is positive/nega-
tive valence. A second is whether an expression refers to a para-/extralinguistic 
manifestation (sob, weep) vs. an internal experience (upset). A third criterion dif-
ferentiates between triggered/reactive experiences vs. moods and general dispo-
sitions. The intensity of feeling constitutes a fourth factor. Another is the ques-
tion whether the experience is due to a “realis” context (e. g. a reaction such as 
dislike.v) vs. an irrealis context (e. g. an intention or an attitude towards a possible 
event such as fear.v). As a sixth criterion, the theory distinguishes 3 major affect 
groups: 
- un/happiness (“affairs of the heart”) 
- dis/satisfaction (emotions related to the pursuit of goals)  
- in/security (“ecosocial well-being”) 
4.2.2 Appreciation 
Appreciation focuses on things; it is taken to concern aesthetics. It is said to be 
about feelings that are institutionalized as propositions which concern a) reac-
tions to things (‘do they catch our attention?’, ‘do they please us?’), b) their com-
position (‘balance and complexity’) and c) their value (‘how innovative, timely, 
authentic ...’). 
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The linguistic prototype that expresses appreciation is as follows: “APPRECI-
ATION construes attitudes about texts, performances and natural phenomena, 
and fits into frames such as I consider it x: … I consider it innovative/unimagina-
tive.” (Martin 2003, 173). 
Figure 4: Overview of appraisal resources (Martin and White 2005, 38) 
4.2.3 Judgment 
Judgment concerns attitudes about people and their behavior; it is thus related to 
questions of ethics. It is concerned with positive and negative judgments of be-
havior / actions. Judgment is said to be about feelings “institutionalized as pro-
posals”. Judgment is taken to have two dimensions. First, in what social esteem is 
somebody held based on how normal, capable, and/or dependable they are? Sec-
ond, what kind of social sanction is placed on somebody with respect to their 
decency and truthfulness? 
The linguistic prototype for Judgment is the following: “JUDGMENT construes 
attitudes about character, designed to sanction or proscribe behavior, canonically 
in the grammatical frame It was ‘x’ of/for her/him to do that” (Martin 2003, 173). 
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4.3 Summary 
The different psychological and linguistic analyses that we have considered high-
light various aspects that could be taken into account in a full analysis of emo-
tional vocabulary. A first aspect to consider is the relation of an emotional term 
to terms referencing other psychological concepts, in particular the distinction to 
cognition; alternatively, the focus on affect vs. behavior vs. cognition. This aspect 
is an important part of Ortony et al.’s 1987 work. Another aspect is the question 
whether there are basic emotions or emotional primes, on which the analysis of 
other, more complex emotions should build. The analysis of emotional vocabu-
lary proposed by Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989) posits five basic emotions for 
English as primitive notions without further internal semantics. (They roughly 
correspond to five of Ekman’s basic emotions.) Wierzbicka's Natural Semantic 
Metalanguage framework is another well-known semantic theory that assumes 
semantic primes. However, there are no specific emotional primes present in her 
inventory other than feel (Wierzbicka 1992, 541). By contrast, neither Ortony et 
al.’s models nor Appraisal Theory assumes primitive emotions. Thirdly, an anal-
ysis might model a typology of eliciting conditions that are assumed. Ortony et 
al.’s 1988 model puts forth a well-developed proposal of this sort. Fourthly, the 
intensity of emotional experience and/or the intensity of lexical expressions could 
be specified as part of the analysis. Appraisal theory pays attention to (lexical) 
intensity. For instance, Martin and White (2005, 48) assign low, medium and high 
intensity to the verbs dislike, hate and detest, respectively. Intensity also is a key 
aspect of Ortony et al.’s 1988 model. However, they are more concerned with 
contextualized intensity of experiences that results from both local and global 
influences. While these influences are relevant to text understanding and may be 
signaled linguistically, they are independent of the inherent lexical semantics of 
the emotion terms. A fifth point to consider is the difference between personality 
traits and phases / episodes of emotional experience. This distinction is present 
in Appraisal theory (also in Johnson-Laird and Oatley’s (1989) model), whereas 
the theories of Ortony et al. mostly seem to focus on the phases, setting aside the 
analysis of dispositions. And lastly, the scope taken by lexical items on the overall 
scenario from eliciting event to the set of coordinated resulting changes of emo-
tional experience should be represented. For instance, does a term refer to a re-
sulting state (e. g. sad.a) or does it focus on the transition into the resulting state 
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(e. g. sadden.v)? This distinction seems to significantly overlap with Appraisal 
theory’s distinction between what it calls mental processes (such as Pat hates 
Kim) and relational states (Pat is unhappy). 
In what follows, we consider how these considerations are, or could be, ad-
dressed by the frame semantic analysis of emotion vocabulary by the FrameNet 
project. 
5 Emotion vocabulary in FrameNet 
If we consider the FrameNet database at the time of this writing (May 2015), it is 
clear that the frame organization implemented focuses on different criteria than, 
for instance, the taxonomy of Ortony et al. 1988 (cf. Figure 3). For instance, the 
frame-mate verbs please and anger in the Experiencer obj frame are in 
different parts of Ortony et al.'s 1988 taxonomy. Likewise, as discussed previ-
ously, the adjective angry and the verb anger belonged to two different frames, 
although the emotion they reference is the same. Conversely, making these com-
parisons shows that the taxonomy does not take into account the valence patterns 
associated with the predicates. In fact, the analyses of Ortony and colleagues 
(1987, 1988) purposely represents many emotion terms only indirectly through 
one of a set of related terms. E. g. the 1987 taxonomy favors stative predicates and 
thus the adjective angry is part of it but not the verb or the noun anger. 
However, we cannot look at the current organization of emotion vocabulary 
in FrameNet as reflecting a single synchronous analysis. Rather, the frames re-
lated to emotion reflect different phases in FrameNet’s development. As an on-
going and living project, FrameNet has over time developed new (and more ex-
plicit) criteria as to how frames should be delimited and distinguished from each 
other (Ruppenhofer et al. 2010). Overall, these new developments lead to smaller, 
internally more consistent frames than were constructed in the earliest phases of 
the project. An important goal was that the frame organization would be more 
suitable for use in natural language processing systems dealing with tasks such 
as textual entailment recognition, paraphrasing, translation, etc. The core criteria 
that were adopted are the following: 
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- The LUs in a frame should take the same number and types of syntactic 
dependents. Scary.a and fear.v can thus not share a frame as the former 
does not obligatorily modify, or predicate of, an EXPERIENCER. 
- The LUs should belong to the same Aktionsart / pick out the same phase 
of complex events. 
- The LUs should have the same entailments. Accordingly, shoot.v is a mem-
ber of the Hit target frame while kill.v and behead.v are in the frame 
Killing. 
- The LUs should take the same participant's perspective on the event (in 
active-form sentences). Applying this criterion, buy.v sell.v are in different 
frames, Commerce buy and Commerce sell, whereas in earlier 
frame-semantic theorizing (Fillmore 1976) they shared a frame.6 
- The FEs should have the same relations to each other across all lexical 
units. This criterion also argues for separating buy.v and sell.v: the PUR-
POSE of the BUYER is not the same as the PURPOSE of the SELLER. 
- The presuppositions and future-oriented expectations associated with the 
lexical units should be the same. Accordingly, examine.v and cross-exam-
ine.v cannot share a frame as the latter evokes the context of a court pro-
ceeding, unlike the former. 
In addition to positive criteria for frame distinctions, FrameNet also established 
which criteria it would not use to divide up frames. 
- Frames should be organized to maximize within-frame suitability for par-
aphrasing. This criterion argues for frames including mostly (near) syno-
nyms. It calls for the splitting up of such large frames as Experiencer 
subj and Experiencer obj that are based on argument linking. 
- Syntactic variants that arise through the combination of LUs with produc-
tive constructions (e. g. the passive or the middle) should stay within the 
same frame. 
- Differences in intensity do not call for frame divisions: good.a and great.a 
both belong to the frame Desirability. 
- Differences due to deixis, register, dialect/variety should not result in 
frame differences. Thus, botch.v, mess up.v, fuck up.v are all members of 
the Bungling frame. 
 
6 If one takes into account FrameNet’s hierarchy, then it is clear that both LUs still evoke the Com-
mercial_transaction frame that connects all related sub-frames. 
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- Differences in valence do not lead to different frame membership. Accord-
ingly, criticize.v and praise.v are both members of the Judgment commu-
nication frame.7 
If we look at the more recent analysis of emotions in FN release 1.5, we see that 
as a consequence of the above desiderata already there are finer divisions among 
the emotion frames. As an example, consider the child frames of the Emotions by 
stimulus frame, shown in Figure 5.  
Some of the frames that appear in this analysis can be mapped onto groups 
that are found in Ortony et al.’s analysis. For instance, the frame Other sit-
uation as stimulus captures the idea of “Consequences for other”. Simi-
larly, the frame Emotions success or failure captures much of what 
is meant by “Prospects relevant (Confirmed)”. However, as the data release of FN 
1.5 represents only a snapshot of an ongoing project, it should come as no sur-
prise that the application of the criteria is not fully realized in the domain of emo-
tion-vocabulary. For instance, the frame Experiencer obj still persists, even 
though includes a very heterogeneous set of predicates with respect to eliciting 
conditions and (emotional) valence. 
In the next cycle of evolution, FrameNet will see a reanalysis of the emotion 
area that aims for the design below, illustrated using the examples of anger- and 
depression-related lexical units. 
Use of unperspectivized frames, with frames for particular profilings: 
- event focus 
- State: (feel) anger.n, have one's undies in a bundle; 
depression, have (got) the blues, be in a funk 
- Inchoative: become enraged, get angry, become depressed 
- Causative: anger.v, tick off.v, piss.off; depress.v, get sb 
down.v 
- experiencer focus, with distinctions for 
- Phase: angry.a, enraged.a ; depressed.a 
- Disposition/Mood: irascible.a ; depressive.a 
- stimulus focus: enraging.a; depressing.a 
This re-organization of the emotion vocabulary captures many of the dimensions 
by which emotions can be organized. The eliciting condition and their construal 
 
7 But note that adhering to this criterion necessarily leads to inconsistencies with respect to para-
phrasability. 
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by the experiencer are packaged in the unperspectivized frame. For instance, an-
ger is an emotion that arises when the experiencer perceives a wrong that calls 
for a response. Fear is an emotion that arises when danger is perceived. Beyond 
the eliciting conditions, the particular scope on the overall scenario is also con-
sistent per frame. For instance, causatives are distinguished from states. Note, 
that the eliciting situations are themselves frames and as such could be related to 
the relevant emotion frames. For instance, the Fear frame might be related to 
the Danger frame via the USE relation. Furthermore, emotion frames can be re-
ferred to by frames that encode actions that experiencers are likely to engage in. 
Accordingly, the Fleeing frame can USE the Fear frame. Through these links, 
the idea of action tendencies in the psychological literature can be captured. The 
frames also capture the difference between personality traits and episodes of 
emotion, which previous models do not deal with.8 The valence of emotions is 
also captured, albeit only implicitly, through membership in the (leaf)-frames. 
 
 
Figure 5: Frames inheriting from Emotions by stimulus 
Basic lexical intensity (e. g. love.v > like.v) is not represented (yet). Also, FrameNet 
does not capture the knowledge about which local variables (in the sense of Or-
tony et al. 1988) influence the intensity of instances of particular subtypes of emo-
tional experience. As noted above, Ortony et al. (1988) suggest that the degree to 
which one is happy-for somebody else depends (in part) on the degree to which 
one likes that person. 
Also unaddressed by the frame semantic analysis is the idea of qualia or the 
subjective feeling an experiencer has when experiencing a particular emotion. 
 
8 Of course, phases of anger and depression still differ considerably in length from each other, the 
former being much shorter-lasting. 
Emotions 
by stimulus
Just found
out
Annoyance
Others situation 
as stimulus
Emotions of
success or failure
Emotions by 
possibility
Emotions of 
mental activity
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However, the inventory of LUs that can refer to particular emotions may capture 
some of the “coordinated changes” in an experiencer that make up the qualia of 
an emotion. For instance, having goosebumps or having one’s hair stand on end 
may simply be reactions to cold temperature. But they also are typical physical 
manifestations of particular kinds of emotions involving arousal, and they are 
frequently used metonymically to evoke these emotions. 
Finally, if we compare FrameNet’s intended restructuring with Ortony et al.’s 
(1988) organization, we see that one key difference between them is that in Or-
tony et al.'s theory the profilings are not modeled. It captures only the higher-
level groupings represented by the unperspectivized frames. Another big differ-
ence is that through its use of frames and frame-to-frame relations, the FrameNet 
analysis addresses not only the modeling of the emotion vocabulary but also the 
modeling of the vocabulary of eliciting conditions and actions that (typically) re-
sult from emotional experiences. 
6 Beyond core emotion vocabulary 
There are aspects of affective language that earlier linguistic and psychological 
theories of emotional language omit from their model. For instance, analyses of 
core emotion language tend to leave aside predicates that evoke scenes where the 
emotional state is presupposed or backgrounded. For instance, laud is speech ex-
pressing praise (cf. (7)). This verb and other verbs like it are missing from the list 
of terms analyzed by, for instance, Johnson-Laird and Oatley (1989). 
(7) Bermuda’s late former Chief Justice Sir Richard Ground, who died last month 
at the age of 64, was yesterday lauded at a packed special sitting of the Supreme 
Court.  
FrameNet’s current representation relates the Judgment communication 
frame that hosts the verb laud to the frame Judgment via the USE relationship. 
However, that connection necessarily leaves the parameter of valence/polarity 
out of its purview because both frames contain items that differ in terms of their 
polarity. For instance, both the positive praise and the negative criticize are hosted 
by Judgment communication. 
A large issue is what traditionally is called connotative meaning. It is outside 
the purview of the lexical models of emotions discussed previously in this section. 
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FrameNet covers some of this information. For instance, the noun coot in the 
frame People by age has a Semantic type Negative judgment. However, the 
representation is inexplicit: we do not know whose judgment this is (the 
speaker’s) and which FE it concerns (the FE PERSON). And, more generally, con-
notations are often not represented in a machine-readable format. For instance, 
for the verb boast.v the verbal definition, which FrameNet takes from the Concise 
Oxford Dictionary, indicates to human users that there is negative judgment but 
there is no semantic type associated with the LU that could be used by a machine. 
On the other hand, it is not clear what specific emotions, if any, terms with con-
notations like coot.n and brag.v should be tied to. If one calls somebody’s behavior 
bragging, does that usually mean one does not like the person? 
Interestingly, connotations and denotations of emotion are not in complemen-
tary distribution. Quite a few expressions carry more than one level of affective 
meaning at the same time. For instance, the adjective infatuated expresses a per-
son’s enthusiasm for a person or entity but typically implies that the enthusiasm 
is excessive or unwarranted in the view of the person who uses the word infatu-
ated to report another person’s feelings (8). 
(8) Indeed, infatuated portfolio managers have begun to court stocks once again, 
and stock prices have climbed almost 10 per cent from their lows in early-July, as 
impressive second-quarter earnings reports soothed equity investors' double-dip 
fears. 
Cases like this call for a more detailed representation than the use of the labels 
Positive and Negative judgment affords. If one simply added both tags to infatu-
ated, it would not be possible to distinguish the layering of attitudes—one by a FE 
towards another FE, one by the speaker/reporter towards an FE – that applies in 
the case of infatuated from the co-presence of contradictory attitudes within the 
frame that is evoked by e. g. ambivalent: 
(9) Over the years I’ve given a number of talks on Rachmaninov, about whose mu-
sic I have felt ambivalent at various points in my life. 
Proposals for explicitly adding information about attitudes between participants 
or by the speaker relative to the event or to its participants have been made by 
Maks and Vossen (2011) and, specifically for FrameNet, by Ruppenhofer and Reh-
bein (2012) and Ruppenhofer (2013). The latter authors propose extending Frame-
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net by a SentiFrameNet add-on, which contains several additional representa-
tional constructs to support fine-grained sentiment analysis. The most important 
of these are opinion frames. These would contain the opinion roles SOURCE and 
TARGET, and they would always be tied to ‘content’ frames via a new type of 
frame relation, with attendant mappings between opinion roles and ‘regular’ FE 
roles. The opinion frames would also capture valence (or: polarity) and intensity. 
Accordingly, they would need to be LU-specific, and they would also need to link 
to LU-specific ‘content’ frames, which in turn would be linked to the existing 
‘content’ frames by inheritance. 
A further frontier is the issue of what lexical information might support (de-
feasible) inferences about attitudes that are not expressed explicitly but impli-
cated. In recent years, Reschke and Anand (2011) and Wiebe and colleagues (Deng 
et al. 2013, Deng and Wiebe 2014, Wiebe and Deng 2014) have generated a lot of 
interest in pursuing this line of research. Consider an example given by Wiebe 
and Deng 2014: 
(10) Obama will finally bring skyrocketing health care costs under control. 
Arguably, skyrocketing is the only inherently evaluative lexical item in sentence 
(10). However, as Wiebe and Deng note, given knowledge about other lexical ma-
terial in the sentence, most readers will infer that the author/speaker probably 
views Obama favorably in this context. The line of reasoning is basically as fol-
lows. Skyrocketing costs are viewed negatively by the speaker. This is explicitly 
coded by skyrocketing. Additionally, one may assume, or context may make it 
clear, that the speaker is a simple health care consumer with no vested interest 
in the financial success of health providers or insurers, so that keeping costs down 
must be her priority. If costs can be counteracted (brought under control) that is 
bad for them.9 Given a logic along the lines of my-enemy's-enemy-is-my-friend, 
the speaker views such an event positively. Further, if a good or bad event is 
recognized as caused by another person, then we value that person accordingly. 
Since, in the example, the curbing of costs is brought about by Obama, he should 
be given credit for it.10 
 
9 For the sake of the argument, we will ignore the possibility that “bring X under control” might 
lexically specify negative judgment of the speaker towards X. 
10 We note here that Wiebe and Deng’s current model treats the speaker’s views on the participants 
as a binary variable. Based on the discussion of global variables influencing intensity in Ortony et 
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Two things are worth noting here. First, the reasoning schema that is used is 
one that also appears in Ortony et al.’s model of the emotional lexicon. The rea-
soning about Actions of Agents tracks closely with the reasoning needed for the 
inference in (10) and applying it to the situation depicted would suggest that the 
speaker, in so far as she feels affected by Obama's action, should feel gratitude 
towards him. (Another possibility is a feeling of admiration, to which personal 
benefit is less central.) In other words, the reasoning schemata that are evoked 
when emotions are reported could also be used to form inferences of potential, 
unexpressed emotions based on mentions of potential eliciting conditions. How-
ever, the analysis goals of Wiebe and Deng (2014) stop short of pursuing inference 
of specific implicit emotions. They focus on recognizing implicit valenced atti-
tudes rather than specific mental/emotional states. Work that pursues the recog-
nition of specific emotions includes, among others, Balahur et al. (2011) and Cam-
bria et al. (2012). However, these latter efforts neither use the same semantic fea-
tures as Wiebe and Deng’s work, nor the same inferential calculi.11 
The second point to make about work like Wiebe and Deng’s is the question 
whether the lexical information needed to support the inferences can be reduced 
to well-known linguistic features. The terminology in the field of sentiment anal-
ysis is not always clear in this respect. For instance, Wiebe and colleagues say 
that one needs to know which participants an event is good-for or bad-for. Here, 
one may wonder whether the notion of good-for/bad-for can be related to the lin-
guistic notion of affectedness, on which there exists a large literature (for a sum-
mary, see Beavers 2011). 
In any event, the inferencing mechanisms that Wiebe and Deng (2014) discuss 
rely on deep lexical semantic knowledge. Even if FrameNet does not currently 
provide all of it, we argue that it is uniquely suited to host and aggregate such 
 
al.’s 1988 model, we might expect for example (10) that on a graded treatment, the more one likes 
Obama and/or the more one values health care, the more credit one will give to Obama. 
11 But note that the emotion recognition systems of Balahur et al. (2011) use semantic role labeling as 
one of its components. This suggests that the current FrameNet could be useful to emotion recog-
nition systems even in its ‘simple’ function as a resource for semantic role labeling, without any 
extensions. This also applies to Wiebe and Deng’s approach, which also makes use of semantic 
roles. 
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knowledge since a lot of it is related in the end to semantic roles resp. FEs. Af-
fectedness (or good-for/bad-for) and its complementary notion of causation are 
very salient cases in point. 
7 Conclusion 
In this contribution, we have pursued several goals. On the one hand, we wanted 
to illustrate how FrameNet ‘works’, in particular, what kind of analyses it pro-
duces and has produced. Using emotion vocabulary as our hook, we have illus-
trated how FrameNet’s analyses have developed over time, due to theory-internal 
as well as application-oriented goals, towards ever more fine-grained distinctions 
and greater within-frame consistency in the attributes of LUs.  Related to this, an 
important practical caveat for users of FrameNet’s data is to be aware that the 
database is not static. This means that analyses change and a snapshot of the 
database does not necessarily represent a state where all areas of the vocabulary 
covered have been analyzed exactly by same principles. This may be unfortunate 
but it is in the nature of an evolving research project. 
A second goal of this contribution was to explore how in the domain of emo-
tions FrameNet’s linguistically oriented analysis of lexical items compares to the 
analysis by domain experts of the experiences that give rise (directly or indirectly) 
to the lexical items. Despite Scherer's (2000) skepticism towards lexical analysis, 
it seems that the notions FrameNet uses for its analysis do match ones found in 
psychological theories (in particular that of Ortony et al. 1988), though in partic-
ular the notion of profile that the linguistic analysis requires may not have any 
kind of counterpart in the psychological theories. As we suggested, a greater 
alignment of psychological theory and FrameNet’s analysis could be achieved if 
additional notions such as eliciting conditions and action tendencies were cashed 
out in FrameNet more often via frame relations. 
Finally, we argued that when going beyond vocabulary that evokes emotional 
experiences directly and considering issues such as connotation or inference, the 
schematization of emotional experiences by FrameNet and psychological theory 
still proves useful. We suggested that descriptions of eliciting conditions can be 
used to infer potential emotional experiences, assuming, in particular, that crucial 
knowledge about the harm and benefit of events is provided. We believe that 
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FrameNet has the required knowledge or can provide it. The need of sentiment 
analysis for deep lexical knowledge thus makes a powerful case that FrameNet 
needs not only to be widened in terms of the lexical items covered but also to be 
deepened in certain ways. We believe that other (related) language processing 
tasks such as metaphor detection and understanding would benefit from such 
deepening as well. 
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